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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Co-defendants William Frisby, Kwane Glover, Terrance Wade, Malani Sanders 
and Jamal Stewart all contend that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support their  
convictions for conspiracy to distribute drugs.  Frisby and Glover also challenge their 
sentences, arguing that the District Court failed to make individualized findings regarding  
the quantity of drugs for which each was responsible.  Finally, Wade urges that, at trial, 
certain Government evidence of association between the co-defendants was unduly 
prejudicial and should have been excluded.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
reject defendants’ arguments and affirm their convictions, as well as the District Court’s 
judgments of sentence. 
I.  Background 
Because we write for the benefit of the parties, we recount only those facts 
necessary for our disposition of the case.  Certain facts specific to each co-defendant are 
recounted below, but the Government also advanced significant evidence common to the 
entire charged conspiracy.  Namely, in 2009, the FBI started investigating a suspected 
drug trafficking organization in the Courtyard Apartments in Philadelphia.  They utilized 
informants, controlled purchases of drugs, pen registers, search warrants, and wiretaps of 
co-conspirator and Government witness Mayoshi Sanders.   
The evidence showed that in March 2011, Sanders transitioned from a street-level 
dealer to a mid-level supplier of narcotics.  Of note, Frisby, Glover, Stewart, and Malani 
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Sanders had known Mayoshi Sanders for many years, while Wade only met him in 2008.  
In March 2011, Mayoshi became a repeat supplier of crack cocaine or powder cocaine for 
each of the co-defendants.  Specifically, in the months between March and May 2011, 
Sanders converted approximately 632 grams of cocaine into crack cocaine and sold it to 
co-defendants and other members of the alleged conspiracy, for resale in the Courtyard 
Apartments.   
Emblematic of a classic hub-and-spokes conspiracy, all of the co-defendants 
purchased crack cocaine or powder cocaine from Sanders and resold the drugs in the 
Courtyard Apartments area.  They arranged purchases with Sanders through brief phone 
conversations which often lacked any identifying names, discussion of price or method of 
delivery.  The Government introduced the telephone toll records of the co-defendants for 
the two-month period in March to May of 2011, which showed the co-defendants were in 
frequent contact with one another during that time.  It also presented eyewitness 
testimony and photographs, showing the co-defendants selling drugs in close proximity 
and otherwise associating in the Courtyard Apartments within the time frame of the 
charged conspiracy.  Further, street-level drug purchasers from the Courtyard Apartments 
testified that the co-defendants often sold drugs to the same set of customers, and always 
without infighting.   
At trial, multiple witnesses testified that outsiders could not sell narcotics in the 
Courtyard Apartments area.  Two drug suppliers, Tiyeak Cook and Alfred Jenkins, 
confirmed that without family or other connections to the area, a prospective drug seller 
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could not set up shop in the Courtyard Apartments.  (App. 851, 914.)
1
  Further, Sanders 
himself agreed that a family or historical connection, common to all co-defendants, was 
necessary “to be able to sell drugs there.” (App. 132.)  Sanders felt so safe in the area, in 
fact, that he refrained from carrying a firearm around the Courtyard Apartments. (App. 
317.)   
The Government also introduced evidence specific to the individual co-
defendants, which we will address in turn. 
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
The standard of review for a sufficiency challenge is extremely high.  “[T]he 
critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal 
conviction . . . is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”   Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).  “The 
district court—and we—are not to act as a thirteenth juror.  Instead, the jury’s verdict 
must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable juror, and the verdict must be 
upheld as long as it does not ‘fall below the threshold of bare rationality.’”  United States 
v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Coleman v. 
Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012) (per curiam)). 
All of the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute narcotics, a crime 
which requires (1) a unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators, (2) an intent to 
                                              
1
 For ease of reference, we utilize the Government’s Supplemental Appendix to refer to 
the record. 
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achieve a common illegal goal, and (3) an agreement to work together toward that goal.  
Id. at 425.  Each of the defendants contends that he was merely in a buyer-seller 
relationship with Mayoshi Sanders and/or other members of the alleged conspiracy.  In 
essence, the defendants argue that there was no evidence they had actually agreed to 
work together in furtherance of an illicit objective.   
“It is well-settled that a simple buyer-seller relationship, without any prior or 
contemporaneous understanding beyond the sales agreement itself, is insufficient to 
establish that the buyer was a member of the seller's conspiracy.”  United States v. Gibbs, 
190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  However, “even an occasional supplier (and by 
implication an occasional buyer for redistribution) can be shown to be a member of the 
conspiracy by evidence, direct or inferential, of knowledge that she or he was part of a 
larger operation.”  Id. at 198.  In Gibbs we noted that certain circumstances may be 
especially probative of a conspiracy, such as “the length of affiliation between the 
defendant and the conspiracy; whether there is an established method of payment; the 
extent to which transactions are standardized; and whether there is a demonstrated level 
of mutual trust.”  Id. at 199. 
By contrast, in United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 2001), we 
held, inter alia, that simply referring a drug customer to a supplier, or vice-versa, was 
insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction.  We further recognized that living with 
another drug dealer and occasionally sharing a common source of supply lacked the 
hallmarks of conspiracy.  Id. at 154-55.  However, then-Chief Judge Becker also noted 
that offering protection, serving as a lookout, providing drugs on credit, and conducting 
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business in code all supported a finding of conspiracy, rather than a buyer-seller 
relationship.  Id.  He took pains to note that conspiracy convictions are not reviewed 
pursuant to set, dispositive factors, but upon the particular facts and circumstances of the 
case.  Id. at 147. 
Turning to the individual defendants here, we find ample evidence that they 
entered into an agreement to work together to distribute drugs.  First, William Frisby 
bought various types of drugs from Sanders on multiple occasions and resold the drugs in 
the Courtyard Apartments area.  Frisby purchased the drugs through phone calls with 
Sanders, which were intercepted and played for the jury.  The lack of any discussion of 
price or method of payment on these calls permits an inference, at the very least, that 
Frisby and Sanders shared a degree of mutual trust indicative of a conspiracy.  Further, in 
other intercepted calls played for the jury, Frisby warned Sanders about police presence 
on three different occasions.  Sanders testified as to the first call, “[b]ecause I’m normally 
having drugs on me [Frisby was] basically just warning me to let me know that they 
[police] down there, don’t come down there.”  (App. 126.)  Sanders also testified that he 
would do the same for Frisby, to “look[] out for him.”  (Id.)   
In warning Sanders on multiple occasions, Frisby acted as a lookout for his 
supplier.  “When one person serves as a lookout during another person’s drug deals, it 
suggests a unity of purpose and an intent to achieve a common goal (to sell drugs without 
being caught) and an agreement to work together toward that goal (because one does not 
serve as a lookout without agreeing to do so).”  Pressler, 256 F.3d at 155.  In Pressler we 
found that serving as a lookout “alone” may be enough to establish a conspiracy.  Id.  
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Here, the evidence of Frisby’s repeated warnings to Sanders, in combination with his 
multiple drug purchases and the other evidence set forth above, certainly permits a 
rational finding that Frisby conspired with Sanders and the other defendants to distribute 
drugs. 
The same analysis applies to Kwane Glover, who warned Sanders of police 
activity on two occasions, also in telephone calls played for the jury.  As Sanders 
testified, Glover “was just looking out for me.  Don’t want me to get locked up.”  (App. 
165.)  Glover stated in one such call, “I need you man,” indicating his desire to have 
Sanders continue to supply him with drugs.  (App. 165.)  Glover also purchased drugs 
from Sanders frequently, reselling them in the common Courtyard Apartments zone.   In 
addition, through a series of intercepted text messages and phone calls, Glover loaned 
Sanders his scale to use in weighing narcotics.  (App. 193-96.)  On this issue, Pressler 
took note of our prior decision in United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 1997), 
finding “the fact that the Powell brothers shared packaging materials demonstrated that 
they had integrated their activities, which implied the presence of an underlying 
agreement.” 256 F.3d at 155.  Accordingly, Glover’s sharing of the narcotics scale and 
his warnings to Sanders, combined with the other evidence noted above, together 
establish that a jury could rationally find Glover guilty of conspiracy. 
Next, Jamal Stewart, Frisby’s brother, bought powder cocaine from Sanders every 
three to four days for “a couple of months.”  (App. 130-31, 139-41.)  Stewart would then 
cook the powder cocaine into crack for resale in the Courtyard Apartments.  (App. 131.)  
Like the other defendants, Stewart arranged his purchases with Sanders over the phone, 
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in conversations played for the jury.  Sanders himself noted that they never made 
reference to any price because, in his testimony, “we did this over and over, plenty of 
times . . . .” (App. 206.)   After Frisby was initially arrested, Stewart spoke to Sanders on 
an intercepted call and laughed about the fact that he had evaded the police.  (App. 303-
04.)  In another call, Stewart and Sanders discussed a plan to rob one of Stewart’s heroin 
customers, though the plan was never put into action. (App. 288-90.)  
In addition, Sanders testified that he and Stewart had a “bond,” such that they 
would share information as to other drug suppliers, and if Stewart knew of a “source that 
I could get something from, then he would let me know and . . . he’d call me and I’d get 
with him.” (App. 136.)  Indeed, Stewart and Sanders both shared common suppliers, and 
on one occasion Stewart drove with Sanders to another drug dealer, whereupon Stewart 
purchased cocaine for both of them and gave Sanders his portion.  (App. 237-39.)  Under 
such facts, taken together with toll records showing that Stewart made 77 calls to Sanders 
and 136 to Frisby in only a two-month period, the jury could rationally decide that 
Stewart was more than an arms-length buyer or seller, and rather conspired with Sanders 
and the co-defendants to work together to distribute drugs.  
Similarly, Terrance Wade repeatedly purchased crack cocaine from Sanders and 
resold it in the Courtyard Apartments area.  Like the other defendants, Wade arranged his  
purchases from Sanders through brief phone calls in which the parties never identified 
themselves.  Wade was among a few people, mostly the alleged co-conspirators, who 
were allowed inside the house of Elizabeth Cadogan, which Sanders testified to have 
previously used for packaging drugs.  (App. 259-60.)  Specifically, Sanders listed 
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himself, Stewart, Frisby, Malani Sanders, and Wade as the people that were permitted to 
go in the house.  (App. 259.)  Toll records shown at trial also established that Wade was 
in regular communication with other members of the conspiracy, including Sanders, 
Frisby, and Stewart, from March to May 2011.  (App. 1648.)   Further, Betty Ann 
McKinney testified that Sanders directed her to purchase crack cocaine from Wade 
approximately once every two months, generally for her own use.  (App. 728-33.)  Under 
Pressler, the repeated referral of a drug customer, standing alone, may not itself permit 
an inference of an illegal agreement.  256 F.3d at 155.  However, taking such evidence 
together with Wade’s drug sales in a common, protected area, his access to a house used 
for drug packaging open only to others in the conspiracy, his toll records, and his 
repeated, familiar drug purchases from Sanders, along with the common evidence above, 
a jury could rationally conclude that Wade had agreed to join the conspiracy and act in 
furtherance of its objectives. 
 Finally, Malani Sanders, the older brother of Mayoshi Sanders, sold crack cocaine 
in the Courtyard Apartments and purchased drugs from Mayoshi.  In 2009, Mayoshi 
“either fronted or gave [free of charge]” a quarter-ounce of cocaine to Malani when he 
was released from prison, in Mayoshi’s words, “just so [Malani] could get on his feet 
when he came home.”  (App. 97, 156.)  Fronting, or providing drugs on credit, even once 
or twice, “is sufficient evidence of a conspiracy.”  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150 
(3d Cir. 2008).  In addition, on one occasion, Malani called Mayoshi to arrange for a 
delivery of a quarter-ounce of cocaine to Brittany Goring, Malani’s wife.  Further, 
Mayoshi testified that he “gave [Malani] the same customers [he] had,” so that Malani 
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“could make some money.” (App. 98.)  Given this evidence, along with that noted earlier, 
a jury could reasonably find that Malani Sanders agreed to work with the other members 
of the conspiracy to distribute drugs.  
 In sum, we cannot conclude that the jury’s verdict as to any of the defendants fell 
below the standard of “bare rationality.”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 431.  We are 
mindful that it is not our place to reweigh the evidence or reverse the jury’s conclusion 
“simply because another inference is possible—or even equally plausible . . . .”  Id.  
There was sufficient evidence of criminal conspiracy as to each of the defendants for the 
jury to convict, and as a consequence, we must uphold those convictions. 
III.   Evidence of Association 
Wade alone contends that certain Government evidence of association between the 
defendants was unduly prejudicial and should have been excluded under Fed. R. 
Evid. 403. “The [challenged] evidence presented consisted of innocuous sightings by 
police of the various defendants, several photos from a pole camera of [Wade] and his co-
defendants standing in the Courtyard Apartments, and phone records showing contact 
between the defendants.” (Wade Br. at 24.)  The District Court reasoned that the 
probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice urged by Wade.  A court ruling 
pursuant to Rule 403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and may be reversed only if 
“arbitrary or irrational.” United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Wade first notes eyewitness testimony and photographs placing him alongside the 
other defendants in the Courtyard Apartments. Wade contends that such testimony 
allowed a prejudicial inference, that merely associating with each other was evidence of 
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criminality. Second, Wade argues that admitting the toll records of calls between the 
defendants was similarly prejudicial, as there was no evidence that those calls were about 
illegal activity.  Both arguments must be rejected.  
As the Government points out, in order to prove a conspiracy it is often necessary 
to establish that the alleged conspirators actually knew and associated with each other. 
See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 333 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that evidence of 
a slip of paper with a coconspirator’s name and phone number was admissible as 
circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s association with a co-conspirator).  Here, the 
evidence of association was used to bolster the other evidence against Wade, including 
his use of a common supplier, the referral of a drug customer, and selling in a protected 
area.  
Further, in order for evidence to be considered unfairly prejudicial it must have 
“an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not 
necessarily, an emotional one.” United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 324 n.23 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note). Unlike a prior criminal 
record or a propensity to lie, the fact that a defendant associated with another, both in 
person and via phone calls, generally would not itself cause a jury to convict on an 
improper basis, let alone an emotional one. We accordingly affirm the District Court’s 
evidentiary rulings.   
IV. Drug Quantity 
Frisby and Glover both contend that the District Court erred under the guidelines 
in attributing 279 grams of crack cocaine to them in the absence of explicit factual 
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findings.  Application of guidelines to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), the criminal 
offense level for a co-conspirator is determined by reference to “all reasonably 
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal 
activity . . . .”  For a drug conspiracy, the court must determine the quantity of drugs 
attributable to each conspirator based on this standard.  “Accomplice attribution often 
results in a dramatic increase in the amount of drugs for which the defendant is held 
accountable, which translates directly into a dramatic increase in the sentence.”  United 
States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 995 (3d Cir. 1992).  Thus, “it is not enough to merely 
determine that the defendant's criminal activity was substantial.  Rather, a searching and 
individualized inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each defendant's involvement 
in the conspiracy is critical to ensure that the defendant’s sentence accurately reflects his 
or her role.”  Id.   
However, even where a district court does not make specific factual findings 
concerning a given drug quantity, the final quantity determination will be upheld if it is 
supported by the record. See United States v. Duliga, 204 F.3d 97, 101 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000); 
see also United States v. Rennert, 374 F.3d 206, 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]e [do] not 
impose an immutable requirement that the district court hold extensive hearings to make 
explicit, particularized findings as to the exact date on which each defendant committed 
to the conspiracy or the precise contours of each conspirator’s agreement.”) (vacated in 
part on other grounds).  
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Frisby and Glover essentially raise two arguments. First, they contend that the 
District Court failed to make a proper inquiry as to the amount of drugs attributable to 
each defendant.  Second, they argue that other co-defendants were provided with a more 
searching and individualized inquiry regarding drug quantity, and they urge that their 
sentences should be overturned on this basis as well.  As for the latter argument, simply 
because the District Court may have utilized different methods to determine the co-
conspirators’ sentences here, that does not automatically render a relatively longer or 
shorter inquiry an abuse of discretion.  We thus reject the contention that Frisby and 
Glover should be resentenced on that ground. We address the first argument, with respect 
to both defendants, in turn.  
1. William Frisby 
The District Court heard in-depth argument from the parties as to the drugs 
attributable to Frisby.  In sum, the Government argued that some 633 grams of crack 
cocaine were dispersed in furtherance of the conspiracy in just the two months of March 
to May 2011, and so Frisby, as a member of the conspiracy, could reasonably foresee that 
amount of drugs as distributed in furtherance of that criminal scheme throughout its 
entire duration. Frisby argued below that when arrested, he possessed only six grams of 
crack cocaine, and that the jury only found him guilty of conspiracy with intent to 
distribute between 28 and 279 grams.  At sentencing, he argued for a sentence at the 
lower end of that spectrum.  
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The District Court found 279 grams of crack cocaine, the high end of the jury 
verdict, attributable to Frisby as a co-conspirator, thus rejecting both the Government’s 
and Frisby’s recommendations.  
Under our precedent, this finding as to Frisby’s responsibility reflects a 
sufficiently individualized inquiry.  Also, by attributing to Frisby an amount of drugs that 
was reasonably foreseeable to him and that was distributed in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, while adhering to the range set by the jury, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion.  Frisby’s sentence is accordingly affirmed.  
2. Kwane Glover 
The Court also heard a thorough discussion of Glover’s responsibility at 
sentencing. The Government argued that Glover was responsible for 1.2 kilograms of 
crack cocaine.  In doing so, the Government relied on numbers derived from Sanders’s 
testimony at trial and Glover’s statements made in a “safety-valve session.”  (Gov. Br. at 
57-58.)  The Government argued that Glover sold approximately 10.5 grams per week for 
14 months, totaling 558 grams. Further, it was undisputed that Sanders distributed some 
633 grams from March to May 2011 to the members of the conspiracy.   
Glover urged a more lenient approach. First, he argued that the Court was 
constrained to the jury verdict of 28 to 279 grams of crack cocaine. Second, Glover 
claimed that he only distributed two packets of crack cocaine a week for about three 
months, totaling 112 grams. He further claimed that he sold primarily from inside a house 
and was therefore not involved in the street-selling that was the focus of much of the rest 
of the conspiracy, and so could not foresee the crack cocaine that was distributed 
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generally by Sanders. Glover also argued, and reiterates now, that he conceded 
responsibility for about 112 grams in a “safety-valve” session with the Government, and 
that the Government did not contest any of the statements made in that session.   
As with Frisby, the Court rejected both parties’ arguments and found Glover 
responsible for 279 grams of crack cocaine as foreseeable to him given his role in the 
conspiracy.  Consistent with our case law, the comprehensive discussion of this issue at 
sentencing constitutes a sufficiently individualized inquiry.  Further, given Glover’s 
extensive involvement in the conspiracy and the evidence noted by the Government at 
sentencing, the District Court’s determination was not an abuse of discretion.  
V. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the defendants’ convictions, the District 
Court’s challenged evidentiary rulings, and the judgments of sentence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
